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Reassembling the Political: the PKK and
the project of Radical Democracy
Introduction
1 One of the most important secular political movements in the Middle East, the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) underwent a profound transformation in the 2000s, following the capture
of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. After a long period of a ‘national liberation struggle’
aimed at establishing its own state, the PKK changed its course towards a project of radical
democracy, based on the rejection of the state.1 The PKK, which had taken its orientation
from the revolutionary left in Turkey, was providing a new basis for radical politics in today’s
Turkey. In this article we will argue that the PKK reinvented itself ideologically through this
transformation, and gave shape to new forms of politics on the basis of an exploration of the
concept of democracy. In this article we explore the content of this new project, and its practical
implications. We will not discuss the organizational re-structuring related to the PKK’s new
political project, since we have discussed this elsewhere.2
2 Through this discussion, our study addresses a gap in Turkish and Kurdish studies. Although
the Kurdish question in Turkey has been studied considerably, the focus has been on state
discourse and security policy,3 with little attention devoted to the role of the Kurdish agency
itself, and in particular the PKK.4 Only few studies deal explicitly with the political ideology
of the PKK.5 Furthermore, works on the PKK tend to treat the PKK as an anomaly, rather than
making sense of it. In this article, we study the PKK’s political project as developed in the
first decade of the new millennium and try to understand how the PKK itself makes sense of
this project. In doing so, the present piece promises both to advance knowledge related to our
understanding of political life in contemporary Turkey, and to make a critical contribution to
contemporary discussions related to radical democracy.
3 The data for this article has been collected through a study of Öcalan’s defence texts and his
‘prison notes’, along with key PKK documents, such as congress reports, formal decisions and
the writings of its cadre, such as Mustafa Karasu. The article is composed of four parts. First,
we trace the evolution of radical democracy as an important concept in political philosophy on
the basis of its foundations and the subjectivities which shape it. Then, we take a closer look
at the changes the PKK underwent after the arrest of Öcalan, mainly considering its ideology.
What the PKK refers to as “radical democracy” will be elaborated on in this part, with the
political projects developed within the context of radical democracy – democratic republic,
democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy – discussed in detail, with consideration
given to theoretical implications. Third, the political dimension of these projects will be
studied in answer to the question of how they currently determining PKK strategy and day-
to-day activities. Finally, in the fourth part, this project of radical democracy and its political
implications will be discussed in terms of the contingencies they create in finding a solution
to the ongoing conflict in Turkey.
Radical Democracy as alternative to Liberal Democracy
4 Since the late 1970s, the understanding of radical politics within the framework of Marxism
has changed.This change focused on its approach to three important pillars of politics; state,
class and party, and radical political thought took the form of ‘politics beyond the state,
political organisation beyond the party, and political subjectivity beyond class’.6 Within this
understanding of radical politics,the reformulation of ‘radical democracy’ has emerged as
the main alternative to liberal democracies of the West. It has given a fresh impetus to the
social and political movements, from ‘liberation movements’ in Latin America to anti-globalist
demonstrations in the US and Europe. In this sense we can talk about a wide spectrum of
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radical views of democracy beyond the liberal version, among which the most well-known was
the one based on the pioneering study of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, first published in 1985. Laclau and
Mouffe had sought to spell out a left-wing alternative of radicalising democracy, deepening it
in the light of ever present conflicts and power.7
5 In the context of this article, however, our focus will mainly be on the studies by Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri,8 which provided a new momentum to the discussion concerning
radical democracy because of their emphasis on the importance of political struggle.9 Hardt
and Negri’s tripartite structure moves from an analysis of the sovereignty in the age of
globalisation – form what they call ‘Empire’,10 “the living alternative that grows within the
Empire,” through ‘Multitude’,11 an “institutional structure and ... [the] political constitution
of society” – to what they call ‘Common Wealth’.12 This scheme can be summarised as
an analysis of sovereignty in the globalised world (Empire), of the revolutionary subject of
the period (Multitude) and of its political project of “expanding our capacities for collective
production and self-governance” (Commonwealth).13 It is this latter sense of radical democracy
as developed by Hardt and Negri that is more meaningful to the Kurdish project, especially
how they conceive representation and sovereignty.
6 Hardt and Negri aimed to work out the conceptual basis for a new project of democracy. For
them, democracy has remained an incomplete project throughout the modern era, and they
try to revitalize its liberating content as constituted in the idea of popular sovereignty (the
word sovereignty derived from the Latin supremitas or suprema potestas, meaning ‘supreme
power’), which may be defined as a power that belongs to the people with no power above
it. They identify several debates related to the idea of democracy today, but for us the most
important are the debates on the subversive characters of democracy and of representation.
7 The subversive character of democracy is related to the fact democracy has been an incomplete
project. Hardt and Negri argue that it was only through social struggle that democracy started
to include the excluded, such as “women, the propertyless and the non-white.” In a similar
fashion, democracy came to be discussed in the domain of economy, which in liberal theory
is not governed by democracy, but markets. This extension of democracy can be referred to
as the ‘subversive character of democracy’: it allows its extension to all facets of society.
8 The second is related to (political) representation, or the separation of sovereign power from
society that is embedded in the concept of representation: “When power is transferred to a
group of rulers, than we all no longer rule, we are separated from power and government”.14
Since the 18th century, this conception of representation had come to monopolize the field of
political thought to such an extent that any contemporary project of democracy has to begin
with a critique of the existing forms of representation. 
9 To this end, Hardt and Negri, following Max Weber, discuss the different forms of
representation that have appeared throughout history.15 Referring to the socialist political
representation, based mostly on the experience of 1871 Paris Commune, Hardt and Negri state
that this failed in a way similar to the liberal and constitutional model. Thus they set about
a search for new forms of representation that limit the separation between the representative
and the represented, and in so doing, simultaneously create alternatives for the state based on
the separation of sovereign power from society.16 In this sense, they claim that the Multitude
as the ‘revolutionary subject’ of the period and its political project (Commonwealth) can
present new contingencies for inventing “different forms of representation or new forms of
democracy that go beyond representation”.17 Constitutive of this new concept of democracy the
Multitude is conceptually distinguished from other notions, such as ‘the people’, ‘the masses’,
and ‘the working class’, and it can never be reduced to a unity or a single identity. Rather “in
conceptual terms, the multitude replaces the contradictory couple identity-difference with the
complementary couple commonality-singularity”18 and it is “the adequate subject which can
construct a new community.”19
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10 In this line of discussion, Hardt and Negri elaborate on how in different struggles, the rebellions
of different singularities can be brought together as a form of revolutionary assemblages,
beyond the hegemonic articulation posed by Laclau and Mouffe. They discuss “the parallel
coordination among the revolutionary struggles of singularities”.20 However these parallel
struggles of identities or singularities are not sufficient for a revolutionary change: there needs
to be radical change in the forms of the organization and decision-making processes.In this
sense, the political organization of the Multitude should also be substantially different from
that of previous resistances, with democracy as not only an aim to be achieved but also a
fundamental principle according to which the whole organizational structure is governed.
This democratic political organizational form will add another element to the destabilizing
and destructive activities of previous revolutionary activities which were led by vanguard
organizations; the project of constructing a new type of power. In this new type of power, by
which the multitude is capable of managing the common, there is no place for taking control of
the state apparatuses. Rather the multitude’s capacities for democratic decision-making should
be consolidated: “Making the multitude is thus the project of democratic organising aimed at
democracy”.21
11 For Hardt and Negri, this making the Multitude based on “the revolutionary assemblages of
different singularities” has the capacity to change the existing patterns of both representation
and also sovereignty. The existing concept of sovereignty is based on one basic principle:
‘rule by ‘the one’, whether this be the monarch, state, nation, people, or party’22. In this
conception of sovereignty, the people, the nation, united in a single body, plays the role of
‘unitary political subject’. In the democracy of the Multitude, however, there is no place for
such sovereignty, and the consequent challenge to all existing forms of sovereignty is at the
same time a precondition of that democracy.
12 In all these discussions, Hardt and Negri admit that this revolutionary process is not
spontaneous and must be governed – but certainly by new forms and tools:
This would have to be democratic not in the false sense that we are fed every day by politicians
and the media with their pretenses of representation, but in the active and autonomous self-rule
of the multitude as a whole.23
13 Only through this form of self-rule can the dilemmas of vanguards, leadership and
representation that plagued previous revolutions be overcome.
14 In this respect, and contrary to contemporary standpoints on the right as well as on the left,
Hardt and Negri give importance to identity politics:
Here is the conundrum we face: revolutionary politics has to start from identity but cannot end
there. The point is not to pose a division between identity politics and revolutionary politics but,
on the contrary, to follow the parallel revolutionary streams of thought and practice within identity
politics, which all, perhaps paradoxically, aim toward an abolition of identity. Revolutionary
thought, in other words, should not shun identity politics but instead must work through it and
learn from it.24
15 Hardt and Negri define three important tasks in this working through identity politics. The first
is to make visible the subordinations of identity which means re-appropriating the identity;
the second is to rebel against the structures of domination using the subordinated identity as a
weapon in the quest for freedom; and the third is to strive for its own abolition.25 They see these
three tasks as inseparable and to be “pursued simultaneously, without, for instance, deferring
the revolutionary moment to some indefinite future”.26
16 From here, we may indicate links to the PKK’s project for radical democracy, which has
envisaged these three different tasks of identity politics. In this project, and just as in Hardt/
Negri’s conceptualization of radical democracy the concept of struggle plays a very crucial
role – indeed, it is through struggle that subjectivity is created. Similar to Hardt and Negri, the
PKK returns to an early modern conception of democracy, with Öcalan27 arguing that one of the
promising elements of early socialist traditions was the idea of constructing democracy from
below and the rediscovery of the idea of the multitude, including different subject positions.28
The development of the Kurdish issue as a field of struggle for freedom and equality is an
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illustration of the various contradictions and the plurality of the social. At the same time, the
history of the Kurdish issue in Turkey shows us the difficulties the left had in articulating this
struggle through socialist strategies. The traditional left demanded the organization of struggle
around class, and in doing so, brushed aside the series of contradictions emerging in and from
the Kurdish issue (such as those of de-colonization, and language, cultural and civil rights).
17 The PKK, which can be criticized for the lack of democracy in its own ranks, is at the same time
developing a program of radical democracy. This may be referred to as a ‘Jacobin paradox’. It
was the Jacobins, responsible for the reign of terror, who developed democracy as a political
project.29 The PKK is Jacobin in the sense that it simultaneously uses violence as an instrument
for the realization of its political program of radical democracy.
Radical Democracy in Kurdish Context
18 During the 2000s, the PKK elaborated a new ideological framework promoting this project of
radical democracy. In doing this, the PKK made a kind of ‘salto mortale’ by reinventing itself
through a series of transformations and arguing that the nation be defined not on the basis of
ethnicity or language but on the basis of citizenship in a democratic republic.30
19 The PKK’s ideological transformation towards a project of radical democracy was based on
the defence texts written by Öcalan and submitted to the different courts in which he his case
was heard. These defences can be grouped into two: those submitted to the Turkish courts,
and those submitted to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg, France,
along with one at a court in Athens (concerning his expulsion from Greece). The defences have
been published in Kurdish and Turkish as well as in other languages.31 These defence texts
were accepted in the consecutive PKK congresses as the official party line. Initially the texts
led to serious confusion in the movement, but since 2005 the ideological and organizational
structures have been adapted to one another.
20 The first texts, submitted for the case in Imralı and then to the Court of Appeal in Ankara,
caused considerable unrest among PKK militants, since Öcalan did not take the assumed
position expected by the party and the Kurdish population. On the contrary, he rejected
claims for an independent state – previously a central aim of the struggle – proposing a new,
‘truly’ democratic republic.In these texts Öcalan did not engage with theoretical or ideological
considerations; they were mainly based on the historical background of the Turkish-Kurdish
conflict in the twentieth century, in which Öcalan stated that he had struggled in favour of a
democratic republic, and thus not against the Republic (of Turkey). Öcalan argued that Mustafa
Kemal, the Republic’s founding father, had also intended to establish a democratic republic,
but was confined by external forces. Of Öcalan’s defences, only this first one can be considered
as a genuine defence to his prosecution, although he argued that he was not concerned with
the legal issue of his case.
21 In his second group of defence texts, submitted to the ECHR, Öcalan deepened his theoretical
considerations. The first of the three volumes dealt mainly with a historical analysis of
civilization, starting in the Middle East, and focusing upon the Sumerians as ‘the earliest
state-based’ society. Although Öcalan elaborated in later parts of the book on other societies
and periods, his main concern was to present the state as the ‘Original Sin’ of humanity.
This was surprising as he was, and is still, one of the political leaders of a society which has
been widely depicted as ‘the largest people in the world without a state’. Initially it created
a kind of alienation among Kurdish circles (a Verfremdungseffekt, in the Brechtian sense).
However, Öcalan continued to elaborate on his critique of the state, including the socialist
experiments, arguing that liberation cannot be achieved by means of state-building, but rather
through the deepening of democracy. In the second volume of his ECHR defence texts, Öcalan
dealt intensively with Kurdish society, history and specifically the role of the PKK. He places
Kurdish society in the history of civilization, presenting it as a natural society or community
opposed to state-societies. The Kurdish society’s naturalness is attributed to an assumed long
standing and deep Neolithic culture among the Kurdish tribes.32 For Öcalan, class (state)
societies and modernization have caused destruction for the Kurds, and the PKK has become
the locus of the last resistance to this pernicious process. Within this framework, Öcalan tried
Reassembling the Political: the PKK and the project of Radical Democracy 6
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 14 | 2012
to show the limits of the PKK and its deadlock, trapped in the ideological-political constraints
of the Cold War, which was continuing to condition the PKK, even a decade after it ended.
Through this work, he aimed to evaluate the history of the PKK, addressing past mistakes.
22 In these defence texts, submitted to an Athens court and the ECHR Grand Chamber, Öcalan
transformed his theoretical considerations into a concept of radical democracy. This idea
of radical democracy was developed in three intertwined projects: democratic republic,
democratic autonomy and democratic confederalism. These three political projects function
as a ‘strategic dispositif’: ideas and means through which Kurdish political demands are
(re)defined and (re)organized.
23 The concept of the democratic republic comprehends a reform of the Republic of Turkey.
It aims at the disassociation of democracy from nationalism, and as such a return to the
“early modern conceptions of democracy” and their radical subversivity.33 Originally, in
the eighteenth century, democracy was formulated in terms of citizen’s rights and a rule
of everyone by everyone. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century however,
modernity lost its content of radical democracy and acquired a cultural meaning, referring to
a unique people.34 A vein in modern thought emerged which considered cultural homogeneity
a requirement for the modern state, an inescapable imperative that manifests and erupts in
the form of nationalism.35 This ‘national’ condition of modernity is exclusive and intolerant,
dictating that people who do not have the ‘right’ cultural characteristics are to choose between
assimilation (genuine or superficial) and migration, while the options of the state range
from assimilation to eviction and ethnic cleansing, or genocide.36 In Turkey, Kemalism was
formulated as a project of modernization in cultural terms, resulting in harsh assimilation
politics towards the Kurds. With his proposal for a democratic republic, Öcalan advocates an
understanding of democracy in terms of citizens’ rights.
24 Öcalan’s radical democracy of his later defence texts was embodied in the concept of
democratic confederalism which he borrowed from the works of Murray Bookchin (1982,
1992, 1993,1996). Bookchin, who called his ideology communalism, suggests a new radical
politics recognizing ‘the roots of democracy in tribal and village communities’ 37 and ends
up with a project of Libertarian municipalism. In this project, he aims at creating local
democratic structures such as ‘community assemblies, town meetings and neighbourhood
councils’. Avoiding the project of libertarian municipalism from becoming vacuous or being
used for highly parochial ends, Bookchin suggests the principle confederalism as ‘a network
of administrative councils whose members or delegates are elected from popular face-to-
face democratic assemblies, in the various villages, towns, and even neighbourhoods of large
cities’.38 For Bookchin, confederalism as a principle of social organization ‘is a way of
democratizing the interdependence without surrendering to the principle local control’.
25 Ocalan, influenced by the ideas of Bookchin, developed a similar understanding of that
principle of confederalism. In parallel to his historical analysis of civilization based on
the critique of the state, Öcalan condemned the failure of real socialism and national
liberation movements who were considered trapped in the ideas of the state and state-making.
Alternatively he elaborated on the protracted effects of the Neolithic society whose communal
values could not have been completely destroyed by the development of hierarchic society
built upon the state. Those communal values which were summarized as the socialization
based on gender, life compatible with nature and society based on communality and solidarity
underlie his conception of democracy in the form of democratic confederalism. On the basis
of those values, the project of democratic confederalism is organized at four levels.39 At
the bottom, the communes in the village and districts which are interrelated at the levels of
towns, cities and regions, are situated. Then the organization of the social groups such as the
women, youth etc. exists. Another level of organization occurs at the cultural scale in terms of
organization for different ethnic-religious-cultural identities. The fourth and final level is the
level of civil society organizations. In this sense the democratic confederalism, based on a kind
of assemblies at village-districts, city and region levels, refers to organisation of the whole
society starting from the bottom-up.40 In another saying, the idea of democratic confederalism
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was defined as a model for ‘democratic self-government’. “This project”, Öcalan argues,
“builds on the self-government of local communities and is organized in the form of open
councils, town councils, local parliaments and larger congresses. The citizens themselves are
agents of this kind of self-government, not state-based authorities.”41
26 In this sense Öcalan has continuously emphasized that this project has nothing to do with
a confederal structure as ‘an association of sovereign member states’. On the contrary,
democratic confederalism aims to consolidate and deepen democracy at the grassroots on the
basis of communities. However there is also the need to reclaim the juridical and political
procedure, to reshape the political organization of a country. Therefore the model of organizing
the people beyond the state should define its relationship with the existing state or official
authority. For this Öcalan first proposed the democratic republic as the form of government
through which the Kurdish question can be solved, and then he developed the concept of
democratic autonomy as a form of relationship. In this sense, democratic autonomy refers to
the type of relationship with the state and in turn with its jurisdiction. In the Turkish context,
it was presented as the option for a democratic political solution to the Kurdish question,
requiring constitutional recognition of the Kurdish national identity. However this recognition
was not proposed by the PKK as a way to draw a line between the Kurds’ democratic
confederal system and the Turkish state. Rather a nested relationship is anticipated which is
stated in such way that “Democratic autonomy is a concept which defines the relationship with
the state…. It can be (realized) even within a unitary structure or in a structure of the states.”42
27 However this nested relationship does not exclude a kind of ‘unity’ among the Kurds dispersed
over different countries of the Middle East. Since Öcalan proposes to build self-governing
bodies throughout Kurdistan, and wherever there are Kurds living, democratic confederalism
is to be considered the main mechanism for the unification of Kurdistan and Kurds. The
Kurdish liberation movement, Öcalan argues, should work for the establishment of such a
system of self-organization.
28 Consequentially since 2005, the PKK and all-affiliated organizations have been restructured
on the basis of this project under the name of KCK (Association of Communities in Kurdistan
-Koma Civakên Kurdistan) which is a societal organization presented as an alternative to the
nation-state. The KCK has aimed to organize itself from the bottom to the top in the form
of assemblies. “KCK is a movement which struggles for establishing its own democracy,
neither ground on the existing nation-states nor see them as the obstacle”.43 In its status, called
KCK Contract, its main aim is defined as struggling for the expansion of radical democracy
which is based upon peoples’ democratic organizations and decision-making power. The
KCK contract sets forth a new mechanism of social relations which transcends the statist
mentality. In this sense, the democratic confederalism as the main organizing idea of the KCK
is valid everywhere where the Kurds live, even in Iraq, where Kurds have constitutional rights
including self-governing their region in a federal state structure. In this project, there are two
determining factors which are the notion of the democracy as people’s power based on society,
not as a form of government, and secondly the exclusion of the state and nation from this
notion.
For Kurdish people, democratic confederalism as a form of political and social system beyond the
state is project for its own free life. It has nothing to do with the recognition by the states. Even
though the states do not recognize it, the Kurdish people will construct it. If they recognized it,
for example within a project of democratic autonomy, it would be easier to construct a democratic
confederal system which would be in the end the product of Kurds’ own struggle.44
29 In tracing the development of Öcalan’s thought in general, we argued that three intertwined
concepts (democratic republic, democratic confederalism and democratic autonomy) played
a pivotal role. In all of these projects the concept of democracy has a central importance and
it has evolved from a notion based on a contradiction between the democratic and republican
tradition to a more radical conception of democracy. For the PKK, democracy represented a
kind of antidote to the central character of the Turkish republic, which was, and still is based
on the French version of nationhood and secularism. ‘The centrality kills democracy’ is a very
basic idea of this approach.45
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30 Now we will look at how these projects determined the political activities of the PKK and all-
affiliated organizations.
Back to the Stage
31 Regarding the political process, since the capture of Öcalan, the PKK and all-affiliated
organizations have undergone a series of changes mostly in terms of organizational
reconstruction. In this sense, the period between 2000 and 2004 can be considered as a period
of ‘impasse and reconstruction’ during which the PKK had levelled down its demands, ceased
military activities, withdrew the majority of its guerrilla forces from Turkey into Northern
Iraq and consequently gave an impression of introversion. The political activities of the PKK
were confined to Öcalan’s case, whose sentencing made Turkish officials to consider the PKK
defeated and dissolving. Not unpredictably, the partial success of the pro-Kurdish Demokratik
Halk Partisi (DEHAP; the Democratic People’s Party,) in the November 2002 election – when
it won 6.2 per cent of the popular vote in Turkey, thereby failing to reach the 10 per cent
threshold but managing to become the leading party in the Kurdish region – did not change the
attitude of the Turkish officials to Öcalan’s case, the PKK or the Kurdish problem in general.
32 Concurrently with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which paved the way for recognition
of Iraqi Kurdistan as a new centre of attraction among the Kurds, the PKK experienced the
greatest split it ever faced. The movement suffered a kind of limbo between 2004 and 2005,
struggling to come to terms with the internal and external developments. There was deadlock,
created by the difficulties to advance in a period of uncertainty. At the same time, with the
local elections of 2004, the pro-Kurdish party DEHAP lost votes compared to 1999. Some of
the Kurdish cities were taken by the ruling party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP; the
Justice and Development Party), which swept to power in a wave of national populism.
33 Öcalan and the PKK tried to overcome this crisis through an organizational restructuring
within the framework of the idea of democratic confederalism. Among the organizational
steps taken in this period, the restructuration of all PKK-affiliated organizations under the
umbrella of KCK and the establishment of a new pro-Kurdish party, the Demokratik Toplum
Partisi (DTP; the Democratic Society Party) in Turkey were the most striking ones. On this
basis, the movement has returned to the stage of political and later also military confrontations
since 2005. The Kurdish movement confronted the Turkish state with civil campaigns openly
demonstrating Kurdish identity claims. In this regard, the campaign for the right of education in
the mother language (Kurdish) and the campaign for Öcalan in which more than three million
Kurds in Turkey and Europe signed up to a petition stating that they ‘recognize Öcalan as
their political representative’, have been the most powerful signals of future Kurdish identity
politics.
34 With the election of 22 DTP deputies in the July 2007 national elections, Kurdish politics
became integral to Turkey’s political agenda. Later on, in south-eastern Turkey, the next
election campaign (conducted nationwide for the municipalities in March 2009) turned into
a political contest between the AKP and DTP, with the DTP gaining  the upper hand. The
DTP won the local elections of March 2009 and nearly doubled the number of municipalities
under its control – to almost 100 Kurdish cities and towns, including Diyarbakır and seven
other important cities.46 It has been argued that, the DTP should be taken as interlocutor, and
“with its incontestable success in the southeast at least should be accepted as the main player
in the region”.47 Some newspaper columnists even considered the PKK and Öcalan as among
the actors in a possible dialogue, suggestions rarely read in mainstream Turkish press.48 Thus,
it would appear that the PKK not only reinvented itself, but also returned to the forefront of
politics in Turkey.
35 But more importantly, during this period, Kurdish politics gained supremacy in appropriating
the space which refers to “the potential of social movements to alter power structures in a given
polity”.49 This appropriated Kurdish public space, mainly symbolized in Diyarbakir, was,
maybe for the first time, combined with nationwide Kurdish politics, including the Turkish
parliament in Ankara which “marked the opening of differential political and social spaces
within the territory of the nation-state”.50 In this sense, the municipalities under the control of
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pro-Kurdish party since 1999 have formed a kind of self-ruling regional body. Gambetti calls
this on the basis of Diyarbakır’s case as “engaging in the city’s decolonization”.
36 Again during this period, the DTP started to voice more openly its political project, the ‘Project
for Democratic Autonomy’, very much in accordance with Öcalan’s concept of democratic
confederalism. For this purpose, ‘Democratic Society Congress’ was held in Diyarbakir in
October 2007 which recognized ‘democratic autonomy’ as a project for Kurdish people in
Turkey. This congress report called for radical reforms in Turkey's political and administrative
structure in order to ensure democratisation and to develop problem-solving approaches for
which the local level should be strengthened. Instead of autonomy based on ‘ethnicity’ or
‘territory’, it suggested regional and local structures which allow for the expression of cultural
differences.
37 In this regard it proposed the foundation of 26 parliaments covering all regions of Turkey.
The report also called to change the definition of ‘nation’, with its ethnic emphasis, to ‘The
nation of Turkey’, in order to find a shared sense of belonging.51 Later on, in November
2007, the DTP held its second congress in which this report was recognized officially by the
name of ‘Democratic Solution to the Kurdish Question - Democratic Autonomy Project’. This
very important development concerning the Kurdish politics in Turkey showed explicitly the
Kurds’ ascending identity demands. This was also interpreted as a new era in the legal Kurdish
politics in which the DTP came to play an important role for the policy of solution whereas
the former legal Kurdish parties, HEP, DEP, HADEP and DEHAP all of which banned by
the Constitution Court, were confined to a struggle for existence against the policies of denial
and annihilation.52
38 In the same congress the DTP adopted some important changes in party statutes in accordance
to the concept of democratic autonomy aiming at the formation of assemblies at each level
of organization. Similarly the municipalities under the control of the DTP took some steps
towards the Kurdish identity politics amongst which the ‘multilingual municipality service’
sparked a heated debate. In 2007, mayor of the Sur municipality in Diyarbakir, Abdullah
Demirbas offered municipal services not only in Turkish, but also in Kurdish, Armenian and
Syriac (Casier 2010)53. Because of this multilingual project, the mayor was taken from office
and his municipal council was dissolved. He was also charged with ‘harming the public by
abusing their position’ and ‘acting in contradiction with the Turkish letters’. However in the
local elections of 2009, Demirbaş was re-elected mayor with more votes than before.54
39 Apart from the legal party organization 55, the new Kurdish project set forth another
form of organization, named the Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (DTK; Democratic Society
Congress),56 which has been founded on basis of the following argument:
Today we had some district and town councils, even if they are local and inadequate. Since they
are not well-founded, the Kurdish people bring their demands to the political party and reflect
them through it to the state. But according to our project, the state should keep its relationship
with the Kurdish people through this congress. If the Kurdish people assembled under the same
roof of this Congress, they would be interlocutor for a solution. And the state which came to an
agreement with this body relinquishes its old structure.57
40 This approach is based on Öcalan’s view of ‘democracy without the state’ in which he argues
for a compromise on a small state with limited power. For him, the Kurdish people should
have their own democratic power structure in their region and this ‘democracy + Turkish state
as a general public authority’ is a fundamental formula for a solution.58
41 The DTK was formed on this basis so as to forge a new political style, defined by the direct
and continual exercise of people’s power and since then it has been concerned with the
various forms of societal organizations, including the district-village, town and city councils,
women and youth associations, and the non-governmental organizations. The spokesmen of
the councils and the delegates elected at the district levels comprise 60 % of the congress
whereas 40 % are representatives of NGOs. The DTP is also one of the constituents which
represent the political space. 600 delegates attended the first (foundational) meeting of the
Congress in October 2007 in which the project for Democratic Autonomy was announced.
The second meeting was held in September 2008 and it took a stand against the ground and
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air operation of the Turkish Army into Northern Iraq. A third meeting held in 2009 just before
the nationwide local elections discussed the election strategy. The DTK held a fourth and fifth
meeting in June and December 2009 in which it proposed a new constitution, involving an
autonomous Kurdistan.59
42 Alongside these organizational activities, the DTK organised an international symposium
and various workshops on ‘New Economic Policies’, ‘Religious Belief Groups’, ‘New
Constitution’ and ‘on Language’. A ‘Conference on Experiences with Negotiation and Conflict
Resolution’ was held discussing how to create dialogue between parties in order to share
experiences and ideas about peace processes, road maps and other related subjects.60In its
final declaration, a solution of the Kurdish question through dialogue was proposed. The
international community was called to make a contribution to the dialogue process. In this
respect, the necessity for both Turkish and Kurdish parties to confront the past was also
emphasized.61
43 In the workshops the DTK presented autonomous local governments,62 education in the mother
tongue and recognition of the identity as common demands of the Kurdish people. The
workshop on language, organized in collaboration with some non-governmental organizations
in June 2010, suggested a project for the protection of languages which are not (official)
languages of instruction. It was recommended that Kurdish and other languages should be the
language of instruction. In this regard the workshop emphasized that non-state actors should
not confine themselves to raise demands for official recognition of the Kurdish language but
should also organize it by themselves.63
44 In sum, we may conclude that since 2005, Kurdish movement in Turkey within the framework
of democratic confederalism, gradually opened up a political and social space for the Kurdish
identity. While going through such a process, the Kurdish movement, which has governed a
significant number of municipalities since 1999, has been based on two main organizational
forms, the legal party, the DTP and afterwards the BDP and a wider congress, the DTK.
They aimed at expanding the Kurdish identity politics based on the concept of democratic
confederalism and democratic autonomy. Lastly, the DTK proclaimed that it will construct
‘Democratic Autonomy’ from the bottom-up. Though admittedly vague in its content, this
proclamation constitutes, on the one hand, the boldest effort ever made by the Kurdish
movement to forge a disengagement from the Turkish public sphere which brings with it
an increased risk of clashes. On the other hand, it can pose the question, could this be the
framework of a ‘real’ solution? In the last part of the article we will discuss this in relation to
the possibilities of a political solution for the Kurdish issue.
Conclusion
45 To conclude we will discuss the contingencies of this project of radical democracy and its
political implications for a solution to on-going conflict in Turkey. First we discuss what this
project has meant for the Kurdish movement in Turkey.
46 It is clear that the 2000s has been the most critical period yet for the PKK. The party has
experienced this critical period in different phases, which can roughly be divided into three
stages: a) shock and retreat (1999), b) impasse and reconstruction (2000-2004) and c) return
to the stage (2005-today). Kurdish and leftist criticisms of Öcalan’s new policies and the PKK
during this period have ranged from accusations of surrender to the Turkish state, even with
allegations of being in the service of the Turkish General Staff, to charges of a complete break
with the movement’s past and its aims, with the conclusion that they are saying farewell to
the dream of an independent united state.
47 What the PKK has experienced in this period was a comprehensive restructuration of its
organization, ideology and political-military struggle. Organizationally the PKK has grown
into a complex system of parties and institutions, as opposed to the Leninist style of a
pioneering party directly overseeing all its activities, as it previously did. Although there
have been considerable changes in the organizational structure, the devoted militant body that
is constituted by a group of ‘professional full-time revolutionaries’ continues to occupy the
central role. The change at the organizational level towards a more complex organizational
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structure – or, towards a multiplicity of interacting institutions – is a reflection of this evolving
praxis. This transformation of the organizational structure addresses a new conception which
is ‘political organization beyond the party’. 
48 Though it has been argued that the PKK abandoned its original position, the realization of an
independent Kurdistan, we may argue that the party creatively inversed the original Leninist
thesis. In 1914, Lenin argued that “it would be wrong to interpret the right to self-determination
as meaning anything but the right to existence as a separate state.”64 Inversing this thesis, one
could say it is equally wrong to interpret the right to self-determination as having no other
meaning but the right to exist as a separate state. According to Mustafa Karasu, a leading PKK
veteran, socialists should not fixate so much on the state as its political project. The concept
of the nation-state, he argues, is not a socialist, but a bourgeois concept. The PKK’s project of
‘radical democracy’, and more in particular the idea of democratic-confederalism, developing
a bottom-up democratic system beyond existing borders, aims to render borders flexible, and
in the long term irrelevant.65 As a matter of fact, through its political projects of democratic-
republic, democratic-autonomy and democratic-confederalism, the PKK is drawing a new
agenda for self-determination, while simultaneously going beyond the concept of the nation-
state.
49 More importantly, during this period the PKK managed to assemble Kurdish identity demands
into a project of radical democracy.This has been achieved through the elaboration of new
ideological and political approaches, which created opportunities for the PKK to enlarge its
scope of interest and activities, thereby creating more space for a Kurdish public sphere. In
aiming at the transformation of society in all aspects rather than capturing state power through
armed struggle, PKK efforts now allow for a broader field of operation.
50 The political-military struggle, meanwhile, shifted more and more in the direction of a political
struggle in which the DTP (afterwards the BDP) with its grassroots organization and elected
representatives (nationally and locally) and the DTK have started to take the lead. Especially
after the elections of 2007, 2009, and 2011 a more powerful Kurdish public sphere emerged.
A prominent Turkish columnist wrote as early as 2004:
After the painful period which Turkey experienced in the last quarter of the twentieth century, a
separate state could not be established on its soil, but a separate political geography has been
formed in its Southeast.66
51 He could not be more right, but maybe did not foresee its concrete manifestation. This
separate political geography is based on forms of self-organization (democratic confederalism)
and the strong conviction and praxis to take one’s own fate in one’s own hand. Since the
election in 2009 this ‘separate political geography’ has been deepened with the arrest of
Kurdish politicians, followed by a political counter-campaign of the Kurdish movement,
including demands for bi-lingual public life within the framework of the project for democratic
autonomy. The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) and the Democratic Society Congress
sparked the discussions on a "Bilingual Life" by demanding the official recognition of Kurdish
language in public life. They also started to put their demands into practice, with municipalities
changing the signboards of the municipalities to Kurdish and Turkish, and local shop keepers
changing their sign boards into Kurdish. The organization the whole society from the bottom
has been on the agenda of the Kurdish movement since 1999, with the take-over of an
increasing number of municipalities in the Kurdish region. On the basis of districts and towns,
the Kurdish movement has formed different structures of self-government producing policies
for the local needs. Later on the project of democratic autonomy aimed at enlarging and
formalising these structures.67
52 In the meantime, the Kurdish movement also tried to present and discuss these projects to both
the Turkish and the global public opinion, with the organization of the Mesopotamia Social
Forum in 2009,68 bringing together organizations and movements from the Middle East and
several other countries in the city of Diyarbakır, and the DTK organization of a workshop
with Turkish journalists, academics, politicians and rights defenders to discuss the project of
‘Democratic Autonomy’ in 2010. The organization of all segments of society from the bottom-
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up, under the principle of democratic confederalism and autonomy, has been covering very
different fields of social life and required various activities. All these activities show that the
PKK’s project of radical democracy involves an active agency of people, in the form of a
struggling force from the local to the regional and global, and more importantly, it shows that it
is a project that is based on bottom-up democracy, and cannot be simply considered a political
project imposed from above. Through communes and people’s assemblies, it aims to surpass
the deadlock of representational democracy. In this sense, the democratic autonomy project in
the form of 26 autonomous regions as formulated by the Kurdish movement presents a radical
alternative which goes beyond the boundaries of the existing political regime. Above all, it
is based on a radical conception of democracy aiming at the dissociation of democracy from
nationalism by excluding state and nation from it and considering democracy as an unrestricted
and unmediated form of people’s sovereignty rather than a form of government. Therefore this
project for democratic autonomy goes beyond the boundaries of the existing political regime as
well the framework elaborated on the basis of EU “acquis communautaire, which uses liberal
democracy as its benchmark”, although there is an on-going discussion if this proposal might
suit the EU Regional Policy given it could be a useful step towards a solution of the Kurdish
question by abolishing the centralism in Turkey.69
53 The Kurdish movement is ready to negotiate a solution on the basis of recognition and self-
administrative rights. They can negotiate the form and boundaries of this self-administration
but do not abandon it. In this sense, the Kurds want to be included in the political body with
their identity based on their inscribed ‘political geography’ which requires a constitutional
recognition of the Kurdish identity in Turkey. This constitutional recognition, including the
notion of autonomy, would also mean a radical change in the existing political regime of
Turkey.70
54 In sum, the Kurdish movement in Turkey which has developed a new project for radical
democracy based on the conception of ‘politics beyond the state, political organisation beyond
the party, and political subjectivity beyond class’ can have the opportunity to change the
centralist tradition in Turkish political system as well as the statist and class reductionist
political thought in the Left in Turkey.
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twin demands for inclusion and autonomy seem to contradict each other. However, the contradiction
only arises if it is assumed that the two are mutually exclusive, a form of reasoning that continues to
block the full recognition of indigenous rights in Chiapas and around the world. Until the 1980s, the
political importance of cultural diversity tended to be subordinated to other concerns related to matters
of state formation and economic development. In Mexico and other Latin American countries, inclusion
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term viability of indigenous autonomy may depend more on its appropriation at the local level rather
than on the revision of legal statutes. In this regard, autonomy is best thought of as a marker of political
identity rather than a legal concept’. (Harvey,  2005)
Pour citer cet article
Référence électronique
Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya et Joost Jongerden, « Reassembling the Political: the PKK and the project of
Radical Democracy », European Journal of Turkish Studies [En ligne], 14 | 2012, mis en ligne le 14
décembre 2012, Consulté le 17 décembre 2012. URL : http://ejts.revues.org/index4615.html
Droits d'auteur
© Some rights reserved / Creative Commons license
Résumé
 
One of the most important secular political movements in the Middle East, the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) underwent a profound transformation in the 2000s. What the PKK has
experienced in this period was a comprehensive restructuration of its organization, ideology
and political-military struggle, changing its course towards a project of radical democracy. In
this article we explore the content of this new project, and its practical implications. Through
this discussion, our study addresses a gap in Turkish and Kurdish studies. Only few studies
deal explicitly with the political ideology of the PKK. The data for this article has been
collected through a study of Öcalan’s defence texts and his ‘prison notes’, along with key
PKK documents, such as congress reports, formal decisions and the writings of its cadre,
such as Mustafa Karasu. We conclude that the project for radical democracy is based on the
conception of ‘politics beyond the state, political organisation beyond the party, and political
subjectivity beyond class’ and can have the opportunity to change the centralist tradition in
Turkish political system as well as the statist and class reductionist political thought in the
Left in Turkey.
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